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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional rule in American labor relations law has been employ-
ment at will: when an employee is hired for an indefinite period of time,
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A., 1968, St. Louis
University; J.D., 1972, Cornell University. The author would like to thank Bryan
Ebbert, Class of 1983, for help in the preparation of this Article.
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the employee or the employer may terminate the relationship without cause
at any time.' The harshness of this rule has been substantially modified.
The National Labor Relations Act,2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,a the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,4 the Equal Pay Act,5
and a number of other federal6 and state statutes now limit an employer's
unfettered discretion to fire workers. Many workers also are protected by
collective bargaining grievance and arbitration provisions, nearly 80% of
which require that employees can be terminated only for just cause. 7 De-
spite these protections, the employment at will doctrine leaves between one-
third and two-thirds of the work force' without legal recourse upon
termination.
Although followed by a majority of states, the at will doctrine is being
significantly limited in a growing number ofjurisdictions.9 Terminations at
will may become the most popular labor-related cause of action in the
1980's, as illustrated by such recent cases as Cancellier v. Federated Department
Stores.10 Three management level employees of over seventeen years senior-
ity claimed that their terminations violated California law" and the Age
1. E.g., Blumrosen, Workers" Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Fran-
cis-AJudge For Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 480, 481 (1970); Summers, Individ-
ual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 484-91;
53 AM. JUR. 2D Master &Servant § 43 (1970); Annot., 12 A.L.R.4th 544, 549 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1981).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
6. See, e.g., Jenkins, Federal Legislative Exceptions to the At- Will Doctrine: Proposed
Statutog Protection for Discharges Violative of Public Poliy, 47 ALB. L. REv. 466, 471-82
(1983).
7. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessag Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979).
8. Id
9. For criticism by legal scholars, see generally Blades, Employment at Will vs.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 1404 (1967); Peck, supra note 7; Pierce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination
at Will: A Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L. REv. 1 (1983); Summers, supra note 1;
Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Righ4, N.Y.U. 22D ANNUAL CONF. ON
LABOR 171 (1970); Comment, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980); Note, A
Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435
(1975); Note, Termination of the At Will Employee: The General Rule and the Wisconsin
Rule, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 637 (1982); Comment, Employment at Will: When Must an
Employer Have Good Cause for Discharging an Employee?, 48 Mo. L. REV. 113 (1983);
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
10. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982).
11. California recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationships. Id at 1318. See also cases cited at note 14 infra.
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 12 They recovered $1.9 mil-
lion in damages and $400,000 in attorneys' fees.' 3 At least twenty-seven
states 4 have allowed causes of action for wrongful discharges, and the ero-
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
13. 672 F.2d at 1315.
14. California: Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172, 610
P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (1980); Adelson v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 128 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895, 180 Cal. Rptr. 676, 678 (1982); Pugh v. See's
Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,322, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 (1981); Cleary v. Amer-
ican Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 450, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726 (1980); Hepp v.
Lockheed-Cal. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411 (1978);
Rabago-Alverez v. Dart Indus., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 96, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222, 224
(1976); Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169,
173 (1972); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 797,
13 Cal. Rptr. 769, 772 (1961); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959); Miller & Estes, RecentJudicialLimitations on the Right
to Discharge: A Caimoia Tilog, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 65 (1983). Connecticut: Sheets
v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471,480, 427 A.2d 385, 386 (1980); Magnan v.
Anaconda Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, -, 429 A.2d 492, 493 (1980). Florida:
Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 1960). Idaho: Jackson v. Mini-
doka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 332, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977). Illinois: Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 140, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 189, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978); Leach v.
Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1146 (1977); Grove
& Gary, Employment At Will in Illinois: Implications and Anticipationsfor the Practitioner,
31 DE PAUL L. REv. 359 (1983). Indiana: Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973). Kansas: Murphy v. City of Topeka-
Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 497, 630 P.2d 186, 192
(198 1); Comment, Limiting the Employer's Absolute Right of Discharge: Can Kansas Courts
Meet the Challenge?, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 267 (1981). Louisiana: Griffith v. Sollay
Found. Drilling, 373 So. 2d 979, 982 (La. 1979). Maine: Terrio v. Millenocket
Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135, 137 (Me. 1977). Maryland: Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 619, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981). Massachusetts:
Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287,-, 429 N.E. 2d 21, 29
(1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101, 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1255 (1977). Michigan: Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 589,
292 N.W.2d 880, 884 (1980); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App.
254, 263, 283 N.W.2d 713, 715 (1979); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo, & Ronton
Ry., 81 Mich. App. 489, 495, 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978); Sventko v. Kroger Co.,
69 Mich. App. 644, 648, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976). Minnesota: Grouse v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981). Missouri: Henderson v. St.
Louis Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. 1979); Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Fu-
neral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Mo. 1963). Montana: Gates v. Life of Mont.
Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont. 1982); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129
(Mont. 1979). New Hampshire: Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H.
915, 920, 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (1981); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
134, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974). New Jersey: Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668,
738, 428 A.2d 1317, 1323 (1981); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153,
157, 443 A.2d 728, 731 (App. Div. 1982). New York: Savodnik v. Korvettes, 488 F.
1983]
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sion of the at will doctrine probably will continue. As stated a number of
years ago by Professor Corbin:
The relations between . . . employer and employee have been
subject to constant evolution during the history of Anglo-Ameri-
can law. It is not too much to say that this is the most important
and far reaching manifestation of the evolution of society, of
human civilization, of the legal, social, political, and economic re-
lations of men and women with each other. There are no longer
the old relations of owner and slave. . . . [W]e are in the midst of
a period in which the pot boils hardest and the process of change
the fastest.' 5
This Article will explore the employment at will theory: its history, pro-
posed statutory changes, and judicial limits. It will also offer suggestions to
management for shaping employment policies to fit the modem interpreta-
tions of the doctrine.
II. HISTORY
Employment at will has been a relatively recent legal development.
Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 462,
443 N.E.2d 441, 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel.,
96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1978),aj'dmem., 70 A.D.2d
791,416 N.Y.S.2d 160, appealdenied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979). But
see Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 297, 448 N.E.2d 86,
88, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235-36 (1983). North Carolina: Bennet v. Eastern Rebuild-
ers, 52 N.C. App. 579, 584, 279 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1981); Beal v. K.H. Stephenson
Supply Co., 36 N.C. App. 505, 510, 244 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1978). Oregon: Simpson
v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, -, 643 P.2d 1276, 1278 (1982); Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 603, 588 P.2d 1087, 1090 (1978); Yartoffv. Democrat-
Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 658, 576 P.2d 356, 359 (1978); Sabin v. Wil-
lamette W. Corp., 276 Or. 1083, 1088, 557 P.2d 1344, 1348 (1976); Nees v. Hocks,
272 Or. 210, 218, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (1975); Speciale v. Tektronix, Inc., 38 Or. App.
441, 444, 590 P.2d 734, 736 (1979). Pennsylvania: Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir. 1979); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 176,
319 A.2d 174, 178 (1974) (dicta); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, -, 386 A.2d 119, 120 (1978); Comment, The Employment-at- Will Rule.- The
Development of Exceptions and Penmylvania's Response, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 477 (1983).
South Dakota: Goodwyn v. Sencore, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 824, 830 (D.S.D. 1975).
Texas: Murray Corp. v. Brooks, 600 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Wash-
ington: Saruffv. Miller, 90 Wash. 2d 880, 886, 586 P.2d 466,469 (1978); Roberts v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 891, 568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977). West Vir-
ginia: Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 682 (W. Va. 1981); Shanholtz v.
Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 182 (W. Va. 1980); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978). Wisconsin: Brockmeyer v. Dunn &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, -, 335 N.W.2d 834, 836 (1983).
15. 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 674 (1960), quoted in Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
[Vol. 48
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Initially, an indefinite hiring was not presumed to be at will, but was con-
sidered to be of specific duration. During the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies, when labor was scarce, a hiring without any particular time limit
was considered to be for one year; the master could not dismiss the servant
without "reasonable cause." 6 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the English rule provided that unless expressed to the contrary, a term of
employment was presumed to be for one year.7 A number of American
jurisdictions followed this rule. 8 Others held that the period of payment
designated the term of employment; thus, if payment was monthly, the em-
ployment contract was monthly and renewable each month as the relation-
ship continued.i9
It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that American
jurisdictions began to hold that an indefinite hiring was considered an em-
ployment terminable at will. As outlined by Horace Wood in his treatise on
master-servant relations:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
primafade a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A
hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring and no presumption attaches that
it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time
the party may serve. 2
0
This view soon became the law in almost all states.2 1 Since even "perma-
16. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425-26 (1765).
17. See Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026 (K.B. 1834); The King v. Inhabit-
ants of Hampreston, 101 Eng. Rep. 116 (K.B. 1793).
18. See, e.g., Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 128, 26 N.E. 143, 145 (1891).
19. See Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison, 128 Ark. 260, 263, 194 S.W. 25, 26
(1917); Pinckney v. Talmage, 32 S.C. 364, 365, 10 S.E. 1083, 1084 (1890).
20. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877), questioned in Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 601-09, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-90 (1980).
21. See Bender Ship Repair v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1980); Daniel
v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 322, 620 P.2d 699, 701 (1980); Givens v.
Hixson, 275 Ark. 370, 372, 631 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1982); Justice v. Stanley Corp., 35
Colo. App. 1, -, 530 P.2d 984, 985 (1974); Somers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 146
Conn. 627, 629, 153 A.2d 426, 428 (1959); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330, 332 (Del.
1973); Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C. 1981); Roy
Jorgensen Assoc., Inc. v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Wilkinson v. Trust Co. of Ga. Assoc., 128 Ga. App. 473, 475, 197 S.E.2d 146,
148 (1973); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 332, 563 P.2d 54, 57
(1977); Mildfelt v. Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 563, 561 P.2d 805, 811 (1977); Production
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 313 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Ky. 1958); Pechon v. National Corp.
Serv., 234 La. 397, 406, 100 So. 2d 213, 216 (1958); Blaisdell v. Lewis, 32 Me. 515,
516 (1851); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray, 198 Md. 526, 532, 84 A.2d
870, 873 (1951); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117 N.W.2d
213, 221 (1962); Rape v. Mobile O.R. Ry., 136 Miss. 38, 39, 100 So. 585, 588 (1924);
Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); Alford v. Life-
1983]
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nent" or "lifetime" employment was inherently indefinite, the courts held it
could be ended at will by either party.2 2 Even when employees claimed
that an employer had specifically promised to terminate only for proper
cause, the courts would find employment at will. They reasoned that such
promises must be supported by consideration separate from the employee's
obligation to work.2" Employers were free to terminate employees for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason.
2 4
The rule is not based on contract principles, for the employer-em-
ployee relation is that of principal to agent.25 An agency is formed by con-
Savers, Inc., 210 Neb. 441, 442, 315 N.W.2d 260, 261 (1982); Jorgensen v. Penn-
sylvania Ry., 25 N.J. 541, 551, 138 A.2d 24, 28 (1958); Garza v. United Child Care,
Inc., 88 N.M. 30, 31, 536 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Ct. App. 1975); Parker v. Borock, 5
N.Y.2d 156, 160, 156 N.E.2d 297, 298, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 582 (1959); Presnell v.
Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 722, 260 S.E.2d 611, 616 (1979); Wood v. Buchanan, 72 N.D.
216, 219, 5 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1942); Brown v. Toledo Mental Hygiene Clinic, 63
Ohio App. 2d 192, 194, 410 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (1978); Singh v. City Serv. Oil Co.,
554 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Okla. 1976); Thomas v. Bourdette, 45 Or. App. 195, 199, 608
P.2d 178, 180 (1980); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d
174, 177 (1974); Oken v. National Chain Co., - R.I. -, -, 424 A.2d 234, 235
(1981); Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, -, 278
S.E. 607, 609 (1981); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981); Hans v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1982); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Tull, 571 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978); Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt.
562, 564, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (1979); Norfolk & S. Ry. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 976, 59
S.E.2d 110, 113 (1950); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 891, 568
P.2d 764, 767 (1977); Kovachik v. American Auto. Ass'n, 5 Wis. 2d 188, 191, 92
N.W.2d 254, 255 (1958); Luken v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607, 611 (Wyo. 1967).
22. See Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156, 1158 (4th Cir. 1982); Littell
v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Russell & Axon v.
Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 912 (Fla. 1965); Terrio v. Millinocket Community
Hosp., 379 A.2d 135, 137 (Me. 1977); Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn.
291, 294, 266 N.W. 872, 874 (1936); Rape v. Mobile O.R. Ry., 136 Miss. 38, 39, 100
So. 585, 586 (1924); Gonzales v. United States Southwest Nat'l Bank, 93 N.M. 522,
524, 602 P.2d 619, 621 (1979); Garza v. United Child Care, Inc., 88 N.M. 30, 31,
536 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Ct. App. 1975); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 82 S.E.2d
403, 406 (1971); Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 205, 87 S.E.2d
486, 489 (1955); Orsini v. Trojan Steel Co., 219 S.C. 272, 276, 64 S.E.2d 878, 879
(1951); Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 12, 21 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1942); Smith v. Beloit
Corp., 40 Wis. 2d 550, 554, 162 N.W.2d 585, 587 (1968); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 392, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1967).
23. See note 67 and accompanying text infra.
24. See note 1 and accompanying text supra. This doctrine had a constitutional
basis during the substantive due process era. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (both overruled in Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 comment a, § 25 (1958) (em-
ployer is the principal, employee is the agent). The contractual obligation arises
[Vol. 48
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sent and it is not necessarily a contract which requires consideration.2 6 The
relationship's commencement and duration depend upon a mutual and vol-
untary agreement of the parties.27 With few exceptions, the principal or
agent has the power to terminate the relationship, even when there is no
right to do so.2 8 Both parties are required to work in close association for
the principal's benefit2 9 and owe mutual fiduciary duties.30 Either should
be free to terminate the relationship at will.
The employment at will doctrine was compatible with American com-
merce in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.3 1 Most businesses
were relatively small, and close relationships existed between masters and
servants. 32 There was also a preference for freedom of contract. If an em-
ployee wished to prevent termination at will, he needed to seek contractual
protection from his employer.3 3 This rarely occurred because most jobs
were not founded upon contracts, and unequal bargaining power existed
only once wages or services have been accepted. Otherwise, the refusal to perform
or accept services is not a breach of contract, but the exercise of a reserved power to
terminate the relationship. See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 96.
26. "While the agency relation is not necessarily contractual in nature, it is
fundamentally a consensual relationship, in that it requires some manifestation by
the principal that he wishes the agent to act for him and some indication of the
agent's consent to act for the principal." W. SELL, AGENCY § 1, at 1 (1975) (foot-
notes omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 15, 16 (1958).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment a, § 15 comments a, b
(1958).
28. According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency:
The principal has power to revoke and the agent has power to renounce,
although doing so is in violation of a contract between the parties and
although the authority is expressed to be irrevocable. A statement in a
contract that the authority cannot be terminated by either party is effec-
tive only to create liability for its wrongful termination.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 comment b (1958). See also W. SELL,
AGENCY § 218 (1975). A power given an agent by a principal as security for suffi-
cient consideration cannot be revoked at the will of the creator. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 138, 139 (1958). For example, a mortgagee is often given
a power to sell property if the mortgagor defaults in payment. This authorization
cannot be revoked at the mortgagor's will. W. SELL, supra, § 229.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 376-398 (1958).
30. Id §§ 376-398, 432-458; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 4 (1979); W. SELL, AGENCY § 2 (1975).
31. See Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modem At Will
Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983).
32. For a discussion of the evolution of American industry from small craft
businesses to mass production enterprises, see B. Commons, Industrial Stages, Classes
and Organizations, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCI-
ETY 19, 30-58 (1910).
33. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908) (both overruled in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)).
1983]
7
Heinsz: Heinsz: Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
between employers and employees. 34 There was, however, little call for
change; most workers were relatively mobile and opportunities could al-
ways be found elsewhere in the growing nation. It has only been in the last
ten years, as mobility and opportunities have declined, that employment at
will has been seriously challenged. Close relationships between business
owners and employees often do not exist in our modern world of multina-
tional corporations. 3' The consensual nature of the employer-employee sta-
tus is absent.
Most industrial nations have protected job security. France, Germany,
Great Britain, and Sweden have laws against unjust dismissals.3" The
United States stands almost alone in retaining the employment at will doc-
trine. In 1982, the International Labor Organization passed the Conven-
tion and Recommendation on Termination of Employment at the Initiative
of the Employer.37 The Convention committed industrial employers to
safeguard workers rights before termination. The United States was one of
the few countries that vetoed the document.
III. STATUTES
No legislature has adopted an unjust dismissal statute, but several have
considered them. California38 and Montana39 have codified the general
rule that employment is terminable at will absent a contract for a definite
period. South Dakota, however, has abrogated the at will doctrine. Its law
states that a "servant is presumed to be hired for such length of time as the
parties adopt for the estimation of wages. A hiring at a yearly rate is pre-
sumed to be for one year."' The employer has the burden of proving
grounds for termination, such as habitual neglect or willful breach of duty,
or continued incapacity.4 1
34. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Holmes,
J., dissenting); SELZNICK, LAw, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 131 (1969); Nel-
les, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165, 181-87 (1931); Comment, Protect-
ing At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1826-29 (1980).
35. Cf. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 66, 416 A.2d 505, 511
(1980) (everyone works for either big government or big business).
36. Summers, supra note 1, at 508-519.
37. Convention and Recommendation on Termination of Employment at the
Initiative of the Employer, as adopted by the Int'l Labor Organization, June 22,
1982, reprinted in The Employment-At-Will Issue, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No.
23, at 72-74 (Nov. 22, 1982).
38. The law provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may be ter-
minated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a speci-
fied term means an employment for a period greater than one month." CAL.
LABOR CODE § 2922 (West 1971).
39. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1981).
40. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-1-3 (1978).
41. Goodwyn v. Sencore, Inc., 389 F.Supp. 824, 829 (D.S.D. 1975).
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In 1980, the Corporate Democracy Act 42 was introduced into the
House of Representatives. Title IV, entitled "Rights of Employees," pro-
posed to amend the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) . Section 1 of
the NLRA would insure that workers would not be deprived of "employ-
ment on the basis of their having exercised their constitutional, civil, or
other legal rights, or because of their refusal to engage in unlawful conduct
as a condition of employment."' ' Section 7 would grant employees the
"right to be secure in their employment from discharge or adverse action
with respect to the terms or conditions of their employment except for just
cause." 45 An additional subsection would have made it "an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee except for just cause." '' The bill died in committee at the end of
the Ninety-sixth Congress.47
Several states are considering legislation that would limit the employ-
ment at will doctrine. Perhaps the most comprehensive proposal is before
the Michigan House Judiciary Committee.4 8 It would prohibit discharges
without just cause,4 9 thereby protecting employees not secured by collective
bargaining, civil service, or tenure.5" The bill exempts confidential and
managerial employees, and businesses employing ten or fewer workers.5 '
Employers would be required to notify employees within fifteen days of the
reasons for discharge and to inform the employee of the right to request
42. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 7489 (1980), reprinted 'n
The Employment-At-Will Issue, 11 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 7-8 (Nov. 22,
1982).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
44. H.R. 7010, § 401(c).
The term just cause' shall be defined in accordance with the com-
mon law of labor contracts established pursuant to section 301 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, except that such term shall not include
(A) the exercise of constitutional, civil, or legal rights; (B) the refusal to
engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of employment; (C) the refusal
to submit to polygraph or other similar tests; or" (D) the refusal to submit
to a search of someone's person or property, other than routine inspec-
tions, conducted by an employer without legal process.
Id § 401(b).
45. Id § 401(d).
46. Id § 401(o.
47. For a comprehensive federal statutory proposal regulating the discharges of
at will employees, see Jenkins, supra note 6, at 512-24.
48. H.B. 5892, 81st Legis., Reg. Sess. (introduced June 17, 1982), reprinted in
The Employment-At-Will Issue, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 66 (Nov. 22,
1982).
49. Id § 3(1). The employee must work for an employer for not less than 15
hours per week for at least six months.
50. Id § 3(l)-(3).
51. Id § 4(1).
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arbitration.5 2 The worker could challenge the termination before the
Michigan Employment Relations Commission by filing a written complaint
within thirty days after receiving the discharge notice.53 At the request of
the employee, the Commission would be required to appoint a mediator to
resolve the dispute.5 4 If settlement did not occur within thirty days, the
employee would have a right to arbitration.55 Parties would share arbitra-
tion costs equally, and the arbitrator would rule within thirty days after a
hearing was set.56 The arbitrator could sustain the discharge, reinstate the
employee with no back pay, partial back pay, full back pay, or severance
pay.57 The award would be final, binding, and enforceable in court.5"
Some workers have used existing state and federal statutes as bases to
set aside discharges for improper cause. In Cancellier v. Federated Department
Stores,59 the plaintiffs joined a tort law claim of improper discharge6" with
an alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).6 1 This allowed them to recover liquidated, compensatory, and
punitive damages. 62 These statutes, however, offer only ancillary protec-
52. Id § 4(2).
53. Id § 5(a). The limit is extended to 45 days if an employer meets the stat-
ute's posting requirements but fails to properly notify the employee of the arbitra-
tion rights. Id § 5(2). Absent notice or posting, an employee would have one year
from the date of discharge to file a complaint. Id § 5(3).
54. Id § 6(1).
55. Id § 6(2), (3).
56. Id §§ 8(1), 11(1). The parties may agree to extend the limit. Id § 11(1).
57. Id § 11(2).
58. Id § 12. The circuit court is limited to determining whether: the arbitra-
tor exceeded his jurisdiction, the award is unsupported by the evidence, or the
award was procured by fraud or collusion. Id § 13.
59. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982).
60. Traditional state tort theory can be a workable approach. For example, in
Geist v. Martin, 675 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff alleged intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. She claimed that her husband, a general agent of the
defendant insurance company, had been discharged in retaliation for exercising
loan privileges. The court found that the complaint stated a state law cause of
action. Id at 862. See also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 75, 79, 427 N.E.2d 829,
832 (1982); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145, 355 N.E.2d 315, 318
(1976); McCullough v. Certain Teed Prods. Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 774, 417
N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (1979). But see Rogers v. IBM, 500 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Pa.
1980); Perdue v.J.C. Penney Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); O'Neill
v. ARA Servs., 457 F. Supp. 182, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Johnson v. National Beef
Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 56, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
62. The ADEA allows liquidated damages, limited to unpaid wages owed, for
willful violations. Id § 626(b). Most courts have not allowed compensatory or pu-
nitive damages under the ADEA. See, e.g., Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590
F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107, 112
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tion, for no legislation directly addresses wrongful discharges. Management
groups have made little effort to support legislation protecting employees
from wrongful discharge because this could erode their present discretion.
Promoting statutes curbing the employment at will doctrine has not been a
top priority for organized labor.6 3 Most unions already have protected
their members with collective bargaining agreements, and they have other
more pressing legislation needs. Therefore, the courts are the key to re-
forming the employment at will doctrine.
64
IV. CONTRACT RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
A. Express and Implied Contracts
A majority of courts have presumed that an indefinite or permanent
hiring is terminable at the will of either party. Even though employment is
primarily an agency relationship, the courts have analyzed the employee's
status in contractual terms.65 They have been unwilling to find express or
implied contracts not to terminate without proper cause for lack of mutual-
ity of obligation.66 Absent a specific contract clause preventing termina-
(lst Cir. 1978); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 570 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th
Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). By combining a wrongful discharge tort action with
an ADEA claim, a plaintiff may recover attorney's fees, as well as compensatory
and punitive damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). In Cancelliei, the plaintiffs
were awarded $1.9 million, plus attorneys' fees of $400,000. 672 F.2d at 1315.
63. See The Employment-At-Will Issue, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at
25-26 (Nov. 22, 1982) (statement of Clyde Summers, Fordham Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania).
64. The New York Court of Appeals recently held that despite the deficiencies
of the employment at will rule, the decision to change it should be left to the legisla-
ture. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 448 N.E.2d 86,
89, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 (1983). See also Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706,
708 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1982); Dockery v. Lamphaet
Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 300, 244 S.E.2d 272, 277, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465,
246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1981); Hans v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1982). This approach overlooks the lack of legislative response to the
problem. With little interest in reform by any special interest groups, the prospect
of legislative change seems dim. The courts created the employment at will rule,
they are free to abrogate it.
65. See Comment, Employment at Will: When Must an Employer Have Good Causefor
Discharging an Employee?, 48 Mo. L. REv. 113, 117 (1983).
66. See Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1980); United
Steelworkers v. University of Ala., 599 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1979); Littel v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Chatelier v. Robertson, 118
So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960); Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594,
598 (Iowa 1973); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895, 568 P.2d
764, 769 (1977) (en banc).
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tion, an employee can end his employment at any time and for any reason.
Many courts have refused to bind employers to implied promises not to
discharge without just cause since there is no mutual obligation on the part
of employees. Therefore, employees must prove consideration, apart from
the promise to serve, before employers are required to continue
employment.6 7
Even when an employer promises to discharge only for just cause, he
may successfully assert a statute of frauds defense. Except for collective bar-
gaining agreements, most employment relationships are based on oral un-
derstandings. In many states, oral agreements are unenforceable if their
terms exceed one year.68 When an employee claims that there is a binding.
promise not to terminate without proper cause, the relationship would nor-
mally be intended to last for more than one year. Thus, some courts refuse
to enforce oral agreements on the ground that they violate the statute of
frauds.
69
An increasing number of jurisdictions are rejecting the strict contrac-
tual approach. They have made the presumption of hiring at will a rule of
.construction rather than an interpretation of law.70 The presumption puts
67. See Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1980); United
Steel Workers v. University of Ala., 599 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1979); Sartin v. Co-
lumbus Util. Comm'n, 421 F. Supp. 393, 401 (D. Miss. 1976); Foster Wheeler Corp.
v. Zell, 250 Ala. 146, 148, 33 So. 2d 255, 256 (1948); Collins v. Parsons College, 203
N.W.2d 594, 598 (Iowa 1973); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305,
311 (Iowa 1971); Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 303, 266 N.W.
872, 874 (1936); Hindle v. Morrison Steel Co., 92 N.J. Super. 75, 83, 223 A.2d 193,
196 (App. Div. 1966); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895, 568
P.2d 764 (1977) (en banc); Smith v. Beloit Corp., 40 Wis. 2d 550, 162 N.W.2d 585,
587 (1968); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 394, 153 N.W.2d 587,
590 (1967); see also Comment, supra note 34, at 1819-20.
68. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 59, § 1
(Smith-Hurd 1973); IOWA CODE § 622.32 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.010
(Bobbs-Merrill 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.922 (Callaghan 1982); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 36-202 (1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978). "Where
any promise in a contract cannot be fully performed within a year from the time
the contract is made, all promises in the contract are within the Statute of Frauds
until one party to the contract completes his performance." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 130(l)(1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 468 (1958).
69. See Weisse v. Engelhard Minerals & Chem. Corp., 571 F.2d 117, 119 (2d
Cir. 1978); Swafford Ice Cream v. Sealtest, 252 Ark. 1181, 1187, 483 S.W.2d 202,
205 (1972); Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344 S.W.2d 639,
642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
70. The independent consideration requirement should be treated as a rule of
construction. "[A] contract for permanent employment, whether or not it is based
upon some consideration other than the employee's services, cannot be terminated
at the will of the employer if it contains an express or implied condition to the
contrary." Drzewiecke v. H & R Block, 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101 Cal. Rptr.
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the burden on the employee to convincingly demonstrate that an employer
has agreed to limit discharges without proper cause. If the employee's mere
promise to render services is sufficient consideration to imply a covenant
not to discharge without proper cause, then every employment relationship
would be terminable only for just reasons. By treating the doctrine as a
rebuttable inference, however, an employee would be allowed to prove an
agreement to discharge for cause without always having to show independ-
ent consideration. Courts should not mechanically and arbitrarily construe
employment agreements; they should treat them as ordinary contracts, and
attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions as demonstrated by the lan-
guage used, the contract purposes, and the circumstances under which the
agreement was made.7 ' Separate consideration should not be the sole de-
terminant of whether an agreement exists to terminate only for just cause.
Indeed, requiring separate consideration is contrary to the general contract
principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of considera-
tion.72 As stated by Professor Corbin: "A single and undivided considera-
tion may be bargained for and given as the agreed equivalent of one
promise or of two promises or of many promises." 73 There is no reason why
an employee's services cannot bind an employer to pay wages and to refrain
from wrongful termination."
The courts have begun to look at a variety of factors to determine
whether an employer is contractually bound to discharge an employee only
for cause. These factors include: the employment duration, 75 employee
169, 174 (1972). See Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 925 (1981); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 602, 440
N.E.2d 998, 1002 (1982); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,
598, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 626 (Minn. 1983).
71. See Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
925 (1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292 N.W.2d
880, 885 (1980); Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 226, 232 (1974).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1979); J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-3, at 136-39 (2d ed. 1977).
73. 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 125, at 535-36.
74. See Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
926 (1981); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 602, 440 N.E.2d
998, 998 (1982); Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 587, 292
N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626
(Minn. 1983).
75. Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561, 564
(D.N.H. 1974); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 924 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 728 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 105,
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1258 (1977). Other courts have given no weight to the length of
time an employee has worked. See, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,
332 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir.) (over 28 years), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Mau v.
1983]
13
Heinsz: Heinsz: Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIE W
commendations and promotions, 76 the employer's failure to criticize or dis-
cipline, 77 oral assurances of continued employment made at hiring or dur-
ing employment,78  past company policies, 79 policy and practice
handbooks,80 any grievance procedure,"' whether an employee has given
up a tenured or permanent position,82 the accrued employee benefits,8 3 and
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 312, 299 N.W.2d 147, 147 (1980) (same); Roberts
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977) (17 years).
76. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 316, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922
(1981); Savodnik v. Korvettes, 488 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
77. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 317, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922
(1981).
78. Id; Rabago-Alverez v. Dart Indus., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 96, 127 Cal. Rptr.
222, 225 (1976); Terrio v. Millenocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.
1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 584, 292 N.W.2d 880,
884 (1980); Sarruf v. Miller, 90 Wash. 2d 880, 884, 586 P.2d 466, 469 (1978).
79. Hepp v. Lockheed-Cal. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408,
411 (1978) (cause of action allowed laid off employee not rehired in accordance
with company's established policy to fill openings with persons laid off within the
past two years); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 620, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (discriminatory enforcement of policies).
80. Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Adelson
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 128 Cal. App. 3d 891, 896, 180 Cal. Rptr. 676, 679
(1982); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 585, 292 N.W.2d 880,
884 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983);
Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Gates v. Life of
Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982); Hernandez v. Home Educ. Live-
lihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, -, 645 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
98 N.M. 336 (1982); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, -, 643 P.2d
1276, 1279 (1982); Yartoff v. Democrat Herald-Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 657,
476 P.2d 356, 359 (1978); Sabin v. Willamette W. Corp., 276 Or. 1083, 1087, 557
P.2d 1344, 1345 (1976). Many courts, however, find that policy manuals and em-
ployment procedures do not imply a contract not to terminate without just cause.
See, e.g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 295 (8th Cir. 1982); Rogers
v. IBM, 500 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Pa. 1980); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095,
1096 (Del. 1982); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 779
(1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 58, 551 P.2d 779, 781
(1976); Aldahir v. Mobil Oil Exploration, 420 So. 2d 714, 715 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637, 638 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Mau v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 314, 299 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1980); Williams v.
Biscuitville, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 405, 408, 253 S.E.2d 18, 20, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 457,
256 S.E.2d 810 (1979); Parker v. United Airlines, 32 Wash. App. 722, 729, 649 P.2d
181, 183 (1982).
81. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
729 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Minn. 1983).
82. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Chate-
lier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 1960); Collins v. Parsons College, 203
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the general practice of the employer's trade or industry.8 4 These circum-
stances may prove that an employer has expressly or impliedly promised
not to terminate an employee without just cause. 85
Some courts have applied the statute of frauds defense restrictively in
employment contexts. In Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundy Co., 8 6 the court
refused to apply the statute of frauds to an employer's oral promise not to
terminate an employee without just cause. The issue was not whether the
parties intended to extend the employment beyond one year, but whether
the contract may have been completed in less than one year. The court
concluded that the agreement was capable of being completed within a
year because the employer could have terminated the plaintiff for just cause
within that time.8 7 The court also suggested that promissory estoppel or
detrimental reliance theories could completely circumvent the statute of
frauds.
8 8
The new approach was taken in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 9 An em-
ployee claimed that upon hiring he was assured by company agents that the
firm would not terminate employees without just cause. The job applica-
tion stated that employment would be subject to the provision of the com-
pany's "handbook on personnel policies and procedures."'  The handbook
N.W.2d 594, 598 (Ia. 1973); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 464, 443
N.E.2d 441, 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982).
83. Lemmon v. Cedar Point, Inc., 406 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1969); Savodnik v.
Korvettes, 488 F. Supp. .822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330,
333 (Del. 1973); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 259,
283 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1979); Eib v. Federal Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432, 435
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 528 (Okla. Ct. App.
1977).
84. Hepp v. Lockheed-Cal. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1978). See also Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 893, 568 P.2d
764, 768 (1977) (no contract to discharge only for just cause, but court looked to
custom and usage to determine whether such an agreement existed).
85. The courts should also consider written and oral negotiations, business cus-
tom and usage, the situations of the parties, the nature of the employment, and the
special circumstances of the case. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 216 (1974).
86. 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979).
87. Id at 257, 283 N.W.2d at 715. See also Mercer v. C.A. Robert Co., 570 F.2d
1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978); Young v. A-T-O, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 626, 628 (E.D. Mo.
1980); White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 48 Cal. 2d 336, 341, 438 P.2d 345, 349, 66
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1968); Mildfelt v. Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 562, 561 P.2d 805, 811
(1977); Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 612, 292 N.W.2d 880,
891 (1982); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 466, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444,
457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982); Hardin Assoc., Inc. v. Brunett, 613 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980).
88. 91 Mich. App. at 257, 283 N.W.2d at 715. See also J. CALAMARI & J. PE-
RILLO, supra note 72, § 19-48, at 736-38.
89. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
90. Id at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
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stated that "[t]he company will resort to dismissal for just and sufficient
cause only, and only after all practical steps toward rehabilitation or sal-
vage of the employee have been taken and failed."9 The employee con-
tended that based on these undertakings, he had left his former job,
forfeiting accrued fringe and salary benefits. After eight years, the com-
pany discharged the plaintiff, contending that it was free to do so under the
employment at will doctrine. The New York Court of Appeals found the
evidence sufficient to support a contract not to terminate without just
cause.
92
The court noted that its task was not to search for mutuality of obliga-
tion, which is not essential to a binding contract, but to find consideration,
a fundamental requisite for any agreement.9" Consideration could consist
of a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee, and its value
was not crucial so long as it was acceptable to the promisee.94 The court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a contract because: the
plaintiff had been induced to leave his first employer by the assurance that
the company would not dismiss him without cause, the assurance was incor-
porated in the employment application, the plaintiff rejected offers of other
employment in reliance on the assurance, and the company had applied the
just cause provisions of the handbook and policy manuals to other employ-
ees.95 Carefully scrutinizing all the circumstances surrounding the employ-
ment relation should lead more courts to find implied promises not to
terminate without just cause. Ordinary contract damages would be recov-
ered, including injury from the breach and expectation damages from the
performance. Such damage awards have been substantial.9 6
B. Promissoy Estoppel
An employee who is unable to prove a contract might proceed on the
theory of promissory estoppel, based on section 90 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts. 97 For example, in Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,98 the
91. Id. at 460-61,'443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
92. Id. at 463-64, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. But cf Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 297, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232, 236 (1983) (rejected tort of abusive discharge and implied promise of good
faith dealing).
93. 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
94. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
95. Id, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
96. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980) ($300,000 award for breach of implied agreement not to terminate with-
out just cause). For a discussion of damages recoverable in a contract action, see J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 72, §§ 14-1 to 14-36.
97. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
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plaintiff accepted a position as a pharmacist, then quit his former job and
turned down another offer. The defendant refused to hire the plaintiff
when it became dissatisfied with references that were not checked until after
the plaintiff was extended an offer. The court applied the principle of
promissory estoppel and held that a cause of action for damages arose even
though the defendant had repudiated the contract prior to performance.
99
The court also found that the plaintiff would have had a cause of action
even if he had been wrongfully terminated after employment had begun.'°°
In promissory estoppel cases, recovery is limited to reliance injury "as jus-
tice requires," 0 1 and excludes expectancy damages. Thus in Grouse, the
damages were limited to the losses the plaintiff sustained by quitting his old
job and turning down the offer of another. '0 2
C. Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
A court may also find an implied promise by the employer not to dis-
charge in bad faith. This approach is based on the theory that parties en-
tering into an employment relationship promise that they will act in good
faith and will deal fairly.' Courts in California,' °4 Massachusetts, 10 5 and
ment of the promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). See
also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 72, §§ 6-1 to 6-13.
98. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
99. Id at 116. See also Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791, 794 (Ala. 1982); Nilsson v.
Cherokee Candy & Tobacco Co., 639 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). But cf.
Walker v. Modern Realty, 675 F.2d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 1982) (no equitable modi-
fication of wrongful discharge action); Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So.
2d 903, 905 (Ala. 1982) (same).
100. 306 N.W.2d at 116.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
102. 306 N.W.2d at 116. In Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers v. Woods, 440 N.E.2d 696
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982), the court held that even though an employee demonstrated
justifiable reliance by leaving a previous job based upon a promise of new employ-
ment by the company, it would award plaintiff only nominal damages plus ex-
penses spent in reliance on the promise of the job, since the new employment would
only have been at will. Id at 699.
103. This duty is recognized in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
comment a (1979):
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its mean-
ing varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforce-
ment of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose
and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it ex-
cludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith"
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasona-
bleness. The appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith
also varies with the circumstances.
This theory is applied in insurance cases because of the inequality in bargaining
power between the insurer and the insured. The insurer is compelled to act in good
faith and deal fairly. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d
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New Hampshire" 6 have found that justified expectations of continued em-
ployment should not be denied in bad faith. In Fortune v. National Cash Reg-
ister Co., 107 a salesman was due a large commission under company policy.
Shortly after the sale, the company terminated him without paying the
commission. The plaintiff had worked for the company for twenty-five
years. Even though the parties' employment contract explicitly allowed
either to terminate at will, the court implied a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. It found that the covenant was violated when the employer
attempted to deprive the employee of compensation by terminating him. 108
The good faith and fair dealing standard is not the same as the just
cause rule. This is illustrated by Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 109 The
company mistakenly fired the plaintiff on a supervisor's advice that the
plaintiff had violated company policy. In fact, there was no company pol-
icy covering the matter. The court noted that the company's failure to
prove good cause for the termination did not necessarily mean it had acted
in bad faith. The absence ofjust cause is only one factor in determining the
employer's good faith. The court found that the company was merely mis-
taken; there was no proof that it had acted in bad faith or with improper
motives.'" 0 Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
659, 673, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899, 908 (1976); Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of
Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions, 64 MARQ.
L. REv. 425 (1981); Comment, Tort Liability for an Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Settle:
A Developing Trend Appropriate for Adoption in Missouri, 45 Mo. L. REv. 103 (1980).
104. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.),cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322, 171
Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980).
105. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, -, 429
N.E.2d 21, 25 (1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104, 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977); Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354,
-, 433 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1982).
106. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
Butsee Howard v. Door Wolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980).
Montana courts may accept the good faith doctrine. See Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins.
Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont. 1982).
107. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
108. Id at 106, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. For a similar case involving an employer
depriving an employee of an earned commission, see Maddaloni v. Western Mass.
Bus Lines, 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982). The New York Court of Appeals
recently refused to imply a fair dealing obligation, finding it inconsistent with the
"employer's unfettered right to terminate. . . employment at any time." Murphy
v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 296, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1983). See also Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 509,
573 P.2d 907, 909 (1977); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 564, 409 A.2d 581, 582
(1979).
109. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
110. Id at -, 429 N.E.2d at 25.
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employer's motive and intentions displace the objective just cause test.
A different measure of damages may be applied in breach of implied
covenant cases. In Cleaty v. American Airlines,"' the California Court of Ap-
peals recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Al-
though the court spoke in terms of the violation of an implied covenant, it
held that the plaintiff could recover damages similar to those allowed in
tort actions, including compensatory and punitive damages." 2 This rea-
soning could have a great impact on causes of action for improper termina-
tion. Because the covenants of good faith and fair dealing are implied, they
apply regardless of the parties express contract.
V. THE TORT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Traditionally, there has been no tort cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge because employers have no duty to terminate employees only for
proper cause. Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396113 was one of the first cases to
recognize such a duty. The plaintiff, a union business agent, alleged that he
had been terminated because he refused to perjure himself before a state
legislative committee. Under a California statute, employment without
fixed duration was considered terminable "for any reason whatsoever.""11
4
This doctrine was subject to considerations of public policy, though, and
the court concluded that the union was requiring the plaintiff to commit a
criminal act that would interfere with the administration ofjustice and vio-
late "the state's declared policy against perjury" in the California penal
code."
5
Most courts that have recognized the public policy cause of action
have required proof of improper intent by the employer and a violation of a
duty founded upon a statute that mandates an individual obligation or cre-
ates a personal right." 6 In Sheets v. Tedd/s Frosted Foods 117 the plaintiff
managed the company's food processing section. He was fired after com-
plaining to the company that it was mislabeling its food products. The
111. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
112. Id at 457, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
113. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
114. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2922 (West 1971).
115. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118,
653() (West 1970). But see Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051
(5th Cir. 1981); Ivy v. Army Times Publication Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981).
116. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174, 610 P.2d 1332,
1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn.
471, 476, 427 A.2d 385, 387 (1980); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Ry., 81
Mich. App. 489, 496, 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218,
536 P.2d 512, 515 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va.
1978); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, -, 335 N.W.2d 834, 836
(1983).
117. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
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court allowed the cause of action, noting that if the company required the
plaintiff to perform improper acts he would violate state food labeling stat-
utes and would risk criminal penalties." 8 Other tort actions have been
brought by workers discharged for refusing to engage in illegal price
fixing," 9 declining to alter pollution control reports required by statute, 2 '
performing jury duty,' 2 ' and attempting to get a bank to conform to con-
sumer protection laws.'
22
Other courts have allowed actions by employees who have been termi-
nated for exercising rights protected by statutes, especially workers' com-
pensation laws. In Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Department of
Labor, 123 an employee alleged that he had been terminated solely because
he had obtained a workers' compensation recovery. The employer con-
tended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
plaintiff was employed at will and subject to discharge at any time. The
court rejected this argument and found that even an at will hiring is subject
to legal rights and obligations.' 24 Although the workers' compensation law
had no provisions specifically preventing employers from discharging em-
ployees for exercising rights under the law,' 2 5 the court found that this was
the clear public policy and that the plaintiff had a cause of action. At least
nine jurisdictions have similarly ruled. 126 Other statutory or constitutional
118. Id. at 479, 427 A.2d at 388.
119. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 169, 610 P.2d 1330,
1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (1980).
120. See Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Ry., 81 Mich. App. 489, 491,
265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978).
121. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 212, 536 P.2d 512, 513 (1975); Reuther v.
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super 28, -, 386 A.2d 119, 120 (1978).
122. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978).
123. 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).
124. Id at 497, 630 P.2d at 192.
125. The defendant argued that the Kansas legislature has twice failed to ap-
prove bills that would have expressly allowed causes of action based on termina-
tions for pursuing workers' compensation claims. The court was not persuaded that
this failure evinced a legislative intent to bar the plaintiff's claim. Id at 496, 630
P.2d at 192.
126. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425,
427 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 647, 245 N.W.2d 151, 154
(1976); Henderson v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. 1979); Arie
v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 670, 428 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1981); Brown v. Transcon
Lines, 284 Or. 597, 611, 588 P.2d 1087, 1094 (1978); Shanholtz v. Monongahela
Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 182 (W. Va. 1980). Other jurisdictions, however, have
barred actions by employees allegedly fired for pressing workers' compensation
claims. See Green v. Ameranda Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 952 (1980); Blevins v. General Elec. Co., 491 F. Supp. 521, 525 (W.D. Va.
1980); Greenspan v. National Medical Care, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 311, 316 (E.D. Va.
1980); Segal v. Arrow Indus., 364 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Dockery
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rights protected from unwarranted discharge include: free speech;'" 7 inter-
ference with contractual rights;1 28 privacy, such as freedom from sexual
harassment 2 9 and immunities from taking polygraph examinations;
1 30
privileges to enforce minimum wage requirements;' 3 ' and rights to partici-
pate in union activities.'
32
Some courts have looked to sources other than statutes to support the
duty not to terminate. In Kallman v. Grand Union Co., 133 the plaintiff was a
pharmacist in charge of one of defendant's New Jersey stores. His supervi-
sor informed him that although the rest of the store would be open on July
4th, the pharmacy would be closed. The plaintiff was told by the state
pharmacy board that this was illegal. The company kept the pharmacy
open on July 4th, staffed by another pharmacist, and fired the plaintiff.
The New Jersey Superior Court held that this termination conflicted with
two public policies: (1) the New Jersey statutes which required a pharma-
cist to be on duty whenever the premises were open, and (2) the pharma-
cists' professional code of ethics.' 3 4 These policies gave rise to an action for
v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 300, 244 S.E.2d 272, 277, cert. denied, 295
N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766,-,
259 S.E.2d 812, 813 (1979); Raley v. Darling Shop, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 538, 59
S.E.2d 148, 149 (1950).
127. See DeBleeker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 506, 438 A.2d 1348,
1352 (1982).
128. See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 452, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 727 (1980). But see Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600,
440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (1982).
129. See Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 332, 563 P.2d 54, 58
(1977) (dictum); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1980) (dictum);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974). But see
Forde v. Royal's Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
130. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir.
1979). But see Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 509, 573 P.2d 907, 909
(1977).
131. See Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 76, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405
(1970).
132. See Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 796,
13 Cal. Rptr. 769, 772 (1961); Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d
245, 249 (Mo. 1963); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 845, 400 P.2d 72, 83 (1965).
Other courts have not allowed actions for wrongful discharges related to labor rela-
tions. See Catania v. Eastern Airlines, 381 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Sand v. Queen City Packing Co., 108 N.W.2d 448, 451 (N.D. 1961). Still
others have found that these are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, thus
precluding state tort actions. See Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699, 702 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 303 (1982); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp.
479, 484 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
133. 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1982). But see Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
134. 183 N.J. Super. at 158, 443 A.2d at 730.
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wrongful discharge. Kallman could have serious implications if employers
will be bound by employees' professional codes. It seems unlikely that em-
ployers or the associations drafting the codes intended that employers be
bound simply because they have hired covered employees.1 35
A few courts have also imposed judicially declared public policies, es-
pecially in the context of whistle-blowing. In Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co., 136 the plaintiff alleged that he had been fired for giving
information to the police concerning a fellow employee's criminal activities.
Although there was no statutory duty or right to assist law enforcement
authorities, the court declared that encouraging this cooperation was a pub-
lic policy that would prevent the plaintiff's termination. 3 7
Perhaps the most liberal judicial approach to public policy was taken
in Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacif Tea Co. 138 The plaintiff, a store man-
ager, had been with the company for thirty-six years. He was terminated
after his store lost $30,000 in a Sunday burglary. The company claimed
that the employee had violated internal regulations requiring daily and
weekend deposits of cash receipts. The plaintiff contended that the dis-
charge was wrongful because the defendant had violated the public policy
requiring that employers maintain safe workplaces. The store was located
in a high-crime area, and the company no longer provided police escorts for
employees making deposits. The New Hampshire court suggested that the
company was creating safety hazards by requiring bank deposits without
police protection, perhaps breaching its OSHA duty to provide a safe work
place.' 39 The burglary had occurred on the plaintiffs day off, and a state
statute required that workers have one day off per week. 4 o The court held,
however, that a public policy duty could arise even though the obligation
was not based on a statute or a strong and clear policy. It was for the jury
to decide whether there was a policy strong enough to outweigh the em-
ployer's right to discharge at will. The plaintiff was awarded $92,000.141
As courts get further away from the statutes, the duties imposed upon
employers become more vague. There is a difference between requiring
135. See Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 696, 316
N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982) (auditors' code of ethics and extensive state regulation of
utility accounting systems confer no employee rights and form no public policy
exception).
136. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
137. Id at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 880. But see Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148
Ga. App. 193, 194, 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1978) (no cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge of employee who contended he was about to report sulpervisor's criminal
activities).
138. 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
139. Ste 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1976).
140. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.33 (1977).
141. Cf Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561., -, 335 N.W.2d 834,
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that an employer not force a worker to commit perjury, and preventing an
employer from firing an individual who causes a substantial loss when the
person fails to make a bank deposit. In cases like Cloutier and Palmateer,
courts must not only define public policy, but must also look at the sub-
stance of the allegations underlying the discharge. For instance, the
Palmateer court may have to inquire whether there was criminal conduct
involved, or in cases like Cloutier, determine whether working conditions are
unsafe.
It is difficult for employers to plan around liability based on the vagar-
ies of judges. While some courts favor job security and abolishing the at
will doctrine, others stress the rights of employers to manage their busi-
nesses efficiently. It is questionable whether tort actions and juries are ap-
propriate for determining public policy limits.'4 2 Therefore, many states
have circumscribed the wrongful discharge tort by requiring plaintiffs to
prove violation of a statute or some other clear and substantial policy.
VI. MISSOURI LAW
Missouri has adhered to the employment at will doctrine. The courts
have consistently stated that no cause of action for wrongful discharge will
exist without a contract for a definite term or a specific statutory provision.
Otherwise, the employer has the right to terminate at any time and for any
reason. 143
There have been some recent exceptions, especially where employees
are discharged or discriminated against for filing workers' compensation
claims. The workers' compensation statute expressly prohibits such
firings.'" In Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 145 the plaintiff claimed that she was
142. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839,
610 P.2d 1330 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
143. Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414,415 (Mo.) (en banc),cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1084 (1981); Howe v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 392 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo.
1965); Maddock v. Lewis, 386 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Mo.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929
(1965); Carr v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 363 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Mo. 1963); ACF
Indus. v. Industrial Comm'n, 320 S.W.2d 484, 492 (Mo. 1959); Christy v. Petrus,
365 Mo. 1187, 1189, 295 S.W.2d 122, 124 (1956) (en banc); Culver v. Kurn, 354
Mo. 1158, 1159, 193 S.W.2d 602, 603 (1946); Newman v. Greater Kan. City Baptist
& Community Hosp. Ass'n, 604 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Cooper v.
City of Creve Coeur, 556 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Maxey v. General
Elec. Co., 382 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Finger v. Koch & Schilling Brew-
ing Co., 13 Mo. App. 310, 311 (1883). Some courts have held that an employment
contract is a prerequisite to any action for wrongful discharge. See Williams v. Kan-
sas City Pub. Serv. Co., 294 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Mo. 1956); Williams v. Jones, 562
S.W.2d 391, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
144. "No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against
any employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee
who has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for dam-
ages against his employer." Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.780 (1978). Before this law was
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terminated after she suffered an industrial injury. A jury awarded her
$40,000.146 In upholding the verdict, the court of appeals found that the at
will rule was limited by the protection of the statute. 147 Because of the
statute, Arie arguably represents only a limited exception to the at will rule.
Other developments belie this contention.
One deviation from the at will rule involves discharges allegedly violat-
ing constitutional rights. 4 ' In Smith v. Arthur C Baue Funeral Home, "9s the
Missouri Supreme Court allowed a cause of action for a plaintiff who
claimed that he was discharged for attempting to secure union representa-
tion. The plaintiff relied on a state constitutional provision that guaranteed
employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.' Although the
court would not grant affirmative injunctive relief to enforce this right, it
remanded the case to determine whether the provision supported a tort ac-
tion for wrongful discharge.
5 1
amended in 1969, the Missouri Supreme Court found no cause of action for those
discharged in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim because the statute
provided for criminal sanctions and not civil suits for damages. See Christy v. Pe-
trus, 365 Mo. 1187, 1194, 295 S.W.2d 127, 128 (1956) (en banc); see also Narens v.
Campbell Sixty-Six Express, 347 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Mo. 1961).
145. 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
146. Id at 145. The petition alleged two counts: count I claimed a violation of
the worker's compensation law; count II was based on the Missouri service letter
statute. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1978). The jury awarded plaintiff $25,000
on count I and $15,000 on count II. 648 S.W.2d at 145.
147. 648 S.W.2d at 150. It was for the jury to determine whether the termina-
tion was motivated by the filing of a workers compensation claim.
148. Missouri courts have recognized causes of action where constitutional rights
are violated or where third parties have interferred with the employment relation-
ship. The courts' statements of the traditional rule were either dicta, or the substan-
tive evidence has not supported wrongful discharge allegations; dismissals have
been justified even under the more liberal standards adopted in other states. The
only exception is Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956) (en banc),
which was overruled by the legislature. Krauskopf, supra note 31, at 253-54. For a
different view, see Comment, Fire at Will: An Anaysis of the Missouri At Will Employ-
ment Doctrine, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 845, 860-61 (1982).
149. 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963).
150. See MO. CONST. art. I, § 29 ("employees shall have the right to organize
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing").
151. The court in Smith relied on confusing precedent, Quinn v. Buchanan, 298
S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957) (en banc). Employees in Quinn brought an action under
article I, § 29 when their employer responded to organization attempts with threats
and discharges. Although the court enjoined the coercion, it denied other relief on
the grounds that the constitution did not provide for compensatory damages or
mandatory bargaining. The employee in Smith sought an injunction against coer-
cion, and damages for refusal to reinstate with back wages. Relying on Quinn, the
court denied reinstatement and back pay. It further denied a prohibitory injunc-
tion against interference with the plaintiff's right to select a bargaining agent be-
[Vol. 48
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Another inroad was suggested in 1982 by Eib v. Federal Reserwe Bank. 152
The plaintiff, an at will employee,' 5 3 contended she had been improperly
fired after she became engaged, based on a policy which purportedly pro-
hibited relatives from bank employment.' 54 She alleged that two officials of
the bank had intentionally interfered with her relationship with her em-
ployer. The court found a cause of action for intentional interference with
a noncontractual employment relationship.' No binding contractual rela-
tionship between the employer and the employee was required; only a rea-
sonable expectancy of financial benefits was necessary.' 5 6 It was incumbent
upon the plaintiff, however, to demonstrate bad faith.'5 7
Although the court denied that recovery was based on the tort of
wrongful discharge,' 5 8 the result resembles those in the implied covenant of
good faith cases. Many discharged employees should be able to fulfill the
Eib requirement that their termination deprives them of a reasonable ex-
pectancy of financial benefits. Because most discharges are initiated by su-
pervisors or personnel officials, third party interference with the
employment relationship can also be shown. The critical issue will be the
cause the plaintiff was the only employee and, as an at will employee, he could not
be reinstated. The court allowed the plaintiff a jury trial on his claim that the
discharge violated his constitutional right to seek union representation. 370 S.W.2d
at 254.
152. 633 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
153. Federal reserve banks are precluded by Congress from restricting their right
to discharge at will. Id at 435; 12 U.S.C. § 341 (1976). See Bollow v. Federal Re-
serve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982);
Armano v. Federal Reserve Bank, 468 F. Supp. 674, 676 (D. Mass. 1979).
154. The bank contended that it's policy prohibited relatives or prospective rela-
tives of supervisors from employment at the bank. The plaintiff argued that this
reason was pretextual, because other employees had been engaged and married
without losing their jobs. 633 S.W.2d at 433.
155. The court outlined these requirements:
1) existence of a valid business relation (not necessarily evidenced by an
enforceable contract) or expectancy; 2) knowledge of the relationship or
expectancy on the part of the defendant; 3) an intentional interference
inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or ex-
pectency; 4) the absence of justification; and 5) resultant damage to the
party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.
Id at 435 (footnote omitted). See also Williams v. Irwin-Willert Co., 604 S.W.2d
640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979).
156. 633 S.W.2d at 435.
157. Id at 436.
158. "This is not. . . an action for wrongful discharge, for an employee cannot
maintain that action absent an employment contract for a definite term or contrary
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good faith of company officials.1 59
Other Missouri developments have been favorable to employees bring-
ing wrongful discharge actions. The courts have upheld oral promises to
employ over statute of frauds objections."6 Missouri courts also have been
more willing to bend the separate consideration requirement by finding
consideration in an employee's leaving another job or remaining with a cur-
rent job for a given time.' 6 ' Perhaps most important is the Arie holding,
which recognized the plaintiff's claim that she was a permanent em-
ployee.' 62 Notwithstanding the employer's assertion that the employment
was temporary, the court upheld the jury finding that the plaintiff was per-
manently employed. This decision was based on oral representations of the
personnel manager, as well as statements in the employee handbook. The
court determined that company rules could give rise to an employment con-
tract. When these rules are relied upon, they become enforceable
obligations.163
159. Id
160. See Wood v. James B. Nutter & Co., 416 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Mo. 1967); Mor-
sinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961); Gale v. J. Kennard & Sons Carpet Co., 182 Mo. App. 498, 517, 165
S.W. 842, 847 (1914).
161. See Fletcher v. Agar Mfg. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 650, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1942)
(agreement to relinquish present employment and devote full time to services of an
employer was consideration sufficient to support life employment contract); Nilsson
v. Cherokee Candy & Tobacco Co., 639 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (re-
maining in employment even in a position which was terminable at will can be
consideration for a promise of an annual bonus); Vondras v. Titanium Research &
Dev. Co., 511 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (employee's promise to perform
services and to use best efforts is consideration for a written employment contract
with a definite term). For an early discussion that mutuality of obligation is an-
other way of stating the rule of consideration, see Schonwald v. F. Burkhart Mfg.
Co., 356 Mo. 435, 449, 202 S.W.2d 7, 14 (1947).
162. 648 S.W.2d at 151. The relevance of whether the plaintiff was a permanent
or temporary employee was not based on any claim of an employment contract's
use of the term "permanent." The court noted that the general rule in Missouri is
that "the term 'permanent' when used in an employment contract with reference to
the term of employment means nothing more than an indefinite employment" and
that such a "contract is terminable at the will of either party and no action will lie
for an alleged wrongful discharge." Id at 150. Whether the plaintiff was a perma-
nent or temporary employee was important because the company had given her a
service letter stating that she was a "temporary employee." Id at 149. If this was
untruthful, as the court determined that it was, the employer was liable for dam-
ages under the old service letter statute. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1978) (re-
pealed 1982).
163. The court held:
Where. . . upon the hiring of an employee said employee is given a hand-
book containing policy statements of the employer and rules of employ-
ment there arises contractual rights in the employee without evidence that
[Vol. 48
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Although Missouri ostensibly adheres to the at will rule, employees
have been increasingly successful in wrongful discharge actions. Statutory,
constitutional, and contractual protections have been expanded to narrow
the number of permissible discharges without cause.
VII. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of decisions management officials must make in
light of the increased recognition of contractual and tort causes of action for
wrongful discharge. At the outset, employers must determine whether to
attempt to preserve all of the management discretion and prerogatives in-
herent in the employment at will doctrine, or realize that there will be a
diminution of discretion and plan accordingly. Either policy presents diffi-
cult choices. For instance, the more an employer informs employees that
the company will act fairly in regard to terminations, the more likely courts
are to hold that these promises are enforceable 164 or give rise to a duty that
will support a tort action. On the other hand, denying all limits on the
employment at will doctrine is unrealistic. A proper recognition of the doc-
trine is necessary to pre-discharge planning.
Management should consider the profile of the average wrongful ter-
mination plaintiff and his effect on the jury. Most are males in middle
management with many years of service. These employees are rarely cov-
ered by the NLRA 165 or collective bargaining agreements. Their termina-
tions are purportedly not based on age, so the ADEA does not apply.'
66
Lacking other legal recourse, these men likely will pursue wrongful dis-
charge suits.
The role of the jury is significant. It can review contracts to determine
whether an expressed or implied agreement exists to terminate for cause
and whether management has violated the agreement.
The jury is always permitted to determine the employer's true rea-
the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would create con-
tractual rights in the employee, and this despite the fact that the state-
ment of policy is not signed by the parties and could be unilaterally
amended by the employer without notice to the employee, and contains
no reference to any specific employee, his job description, or
compensation.
Id at 153 (citing Tousaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980)).
164. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 443 N.E.2d 441,445,
457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
450, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 614, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980).
165. Supervisors of employers covered by the NLRA are expressly excluded
from its protections. See 29 U.S.C § 152(2), (3), (11) (1976).
166. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976). But see Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982).
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son for discharging the employee .... In addition to deciding
questions of fact and determining the employer's true motive for
discharge, the jury should, where such a promise was made, de-
cide whether the reason for discharge amounts to good cause: is it
the kind of thing that justifies terminating the employment rela-
tionship? Does it demonstrate that the employee was no longer
doing the job?' 6 7
A jury may also consider whether the employer uniformly enforced its rules,
and set aside discriminatory discharges, as in Touissaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield 168 These factors are similar to those weighed by labor arbitrators to
determine the propriety of discharges under collective bargaining agree-
ments, which require just cause for discharge.'6 9 In effect, cases like Touis-
saint irhiply a just cause discharge agreement in an employment
relationship, with a jury rather than an arbiter acting as the trier of fact.
Juries may have even more latitude in tort cases. In Cloutier, the court
held that it was the role of the jury to assess whether an employer had
violated a public policy and to determine whether a duty existed in the first
place.170 This standard gives juries flexibility to second guess employers'
judgments, markedly limiting management discretion. Juries invariably
will find for the older worker who has been fired without prospects of re-
employment, at the expense of management.1
7 1
167. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 621, 622, 292
N.W.2d 880, 895-96 (1980). But see Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or.
96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (en banc) (although handbook and personnel policies
could impose a just cause standard, a court could not make an independent deter-
mination of just cause but decide only if upon substantial evidence the employer's
decision was made in good faith).
168. 408 Mich. at 624, 292 N.W.2d at 897.
169. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 610-66 (3d ed.
1976); M. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIsPUTEs 236-37
(1974). Because discharge is the most severe employment penalty, the burden of
proof is on the employer to show that the act occurred, and that the degree of
discipline is warranted. Kroger Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 989, 991 (1978) (Heinsz,
Arb.). See also Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 435, 437 (1970)
(Rohman, Arb.); G. Heilman Brewing Co., 54 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 10 (1969) (Solo-
mon, Arb.).
170. Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 920, 436 A.2d 1140,
1144 (1981).
171. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.),cerl.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 0982); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2287, -, 429 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373
Mass. 96, 100, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (1977); Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 595, 292 N.W.2d 880, 883 (1980); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648
S.W.2d 142, 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121
N.H. 915, 919, 436 A.2d 1140, 1142 (1981); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
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Employers must evaluate all aspects of the employment relationship
with the reminder that management policies and practices might be re-
viewed by a jury. Although management might wish to maintain the ut-
most discretion from hiring to termination, personnel policies should insure
that discretion is exercised fairly. Otherwise, wrongful discharge suits will
increase, and morale and positive employee relations will deteriorate.
A. Hiring
Recruiters often oversell positions to prospective employees to insure
that the company secures the best applicants. Statements or promises al-
leged to have been made by hiring personnel often have been resurrected
years later as bases for wrongful discharge claims.' 7 2 These oral representa-
tions are a legitimate basis for liability.'7 3 This evidence is difficult to re-
fute because company officials who hire cannot remember every statement
made to each candidate, or the officials may have long since left the com-
pany when the suit is brought.' 74 Recruiters should avoid overstatements,
for a jury may construe them as promises of job security.
Job advertisements and interviews should avoid terms like "tenure,"
''permanent employment," "full-time," and "you will work for us as long as
you are doing the job."' 7 5 These words can give rise to expectations of
continued employment and act as an estoppel when a worker is later termi-
nated. Job descriptions should accurately describe the employee's duties so
that a person cannot later claim an improper discharge because he was
forced to perform a task which was not agreed upon at hiring.
A properly worded job application can discourage expectations that
termination will be based only on just cause. Since the application can be
written in accordance with company policy and is not dependent upon the
official who is discussing employment with a job applicant, it can reinforce
the idea that the employment is terminable at will. It is also a good oppor-
tunity for a company to disclaim any oral statements which might lead to
172. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 317, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 919 (1981) (plaintiff told by president-general manager that "if you are loyal to
• ..[the company] and do a good job, your future is secure"); Cleary v. American
Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 724 (1980) (plaintiff
claimed an oral contract arose upon his hiring in 1958, 18 years before discharge).
173. See Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
927 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980). A number of courts have recognized these oral representations
notwithstanding the statute of frauds. See notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra.
174. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 317, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 919 (1981) (company president that made oral assurances over 30 years prior
to the discharge was deceased).
175. Id at 317, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 597, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57
N.Y.2d 458, 465, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982).
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an applicant's belief in permanent job security. The application should af-
firm that if the applicant believes that contrary statements indicating job
security have been made, he should clarify them through a designated per-
son other than the one discussing the hiring. In Novosel V. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 176 the court granted the company's motion for summary judgment,
partly on the basis of disclaimers in the job application that the plaintiff
had signed.'
77
In some instances, the parties may prefer an individual contract. The
employer should remember that if a contract is for a specific term, the legal
presumption is that the employer cannot abrogate it without good cause. 178
If an employer wishes to make the hiring at will, despite a written contract
for a definite term, the employer must specify this in the contract in a man-
ner clear to the applicant. A discussion about the hiring at will and a clause
in bold face type should be integrated into the hiring process. A clause for
liquidated damages might also be considered, since damages in wrongful
discharge cases are often speculative.79
B. Probationary Period
"Probationary period" has a definite meaning in collective bargaining.
Under most probationary clauses, a union agrees that management can ter-
minate an employee without justification during an initial period of em-
ployment. 8 ' Once this time has elapsed, however, the employee receives
all of the protections of the labor contract and can be discharged only with
just cause. Because this meaning is so well understood in labor relations,
employers should avoid using the term "probation" with respect to employ-
ees hired at will. Otherwise a court or a jury might construe the term to
mean that a worker who completes a probationary period becomes a per-
manent employee, unless he is fired for just cause."' Instead, all references
to initial periods of employment should be termed "trial," "examination,"
"introductory," or "commencement."
176. 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
177. Id at 346. The application included this disclaimer:
I agree to conform to the rules and regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
and my employment and compensation can be terminated without cause,
and with or without notice, at any time at the option of either the com-
pany or myself. I understand that no store manager or representative of
Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the president or vice-president of the
Company, has any authority to enter into any agreement for employment
for any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the
foregoing.
178. See Alpern v. Hurwitz, 644 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1981).
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1)(1979); J. CALAMARI
&J. PERILLO, supra note 72, § 14-31.
180. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 169, at 613-14.
181. See, e.g., Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (1980).
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During the initial hiring, an employer should carefully evaluate an em-
ployee. It is at this period that individuals who will present difficulties
should be terminated, if possible, in order to avoid later wrongful discharge
suits filed by longer-term employees. The introductory period should be
long enough so that supervisors and management officials have time to
properly appraise the employee's performance. Management should also
be careful in extending examination periods for individual employees unless
it is done according to a uniform company policy. Otherwise those termi-
nated without receiving such an extension could claim discrimination and
wrongful discharge.
C. Employment Policies and Practices
Most employers, particularly larger ones, have found it to be good
management policy to establish written employee policies and proce-
dures.'1 2 In this way, front line supervisors will be aware of a company's
labor relations procedures and will be able to apply uniform guidelines to
employee conduct. Written personnel manuals also tell employees their
rights and duties. Situations like Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, where
the employer had a 260 page employee manual, are not unusual.' 8 3 If an
employee files a wrongful discharge action, personnel manuals and employ-
ment policies will be the primary evidence of whether there was a contract
not to terminate without just cause. These written policies should never
promise more employment rights than the company can deliver and they
should be drafted in a manner which promotes the efficiency of the opera-
tion. The Michigan Supreme Court responded to the argument in Touis-
saint that enforcing contracts requiring cause for discharge will lead to
employee incompetence and inefficiency: "[N]o employer is obliged to
enter into such a contract. . .[and] those who do. . .must be permitted
to establish their own standards for job performance and to dismiss for non-
adherence to those standards although another employer or the jury might
have established lower standards."'
' 8 4
To minimize the chance that written procedures will be considered en-
forceable promises, employers should: (1) express that manuals and policies
are not contracts and give rise to no contractual obligations;'8 5 (2) reserve
the right to change at any time, with or without notice, any of the policies
or practices; (3) state that the policy is that employees are terminable at
will; and (4) delete all language which implies vested rights of termination
for cause, including phrases like "your employment is secure," ''you will be
treated fairly," or any other words that might be construed to limit an em-
182. See note 172 supra.
183. 408 Mich. at 579, 292 N.W.2d at 880.
184. Id at 623, 292 N.W.2d at 896-97.
185. Kari v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 98, 261 N.W.2d 222, 224
(1977), rev'e 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank,
207 Neb. 308, 314, 299 N.W.2d 147, 150 (1980).
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ployer's right to discharge. 1 6 An employer should also consider listing
types of offenses or unacceptable conduct, but the standard for work per-
formance should give management considerable discretion to determine the
propriety of an employee's conduct.' 8 7 A statement should be specifically
included that any listing of infractions and discipline is not exclusive.
A good example of such an approach is Kari v. General Moors Corp., 188
where the court held that a personnel handbook was not a contract between
the employer and the employee. The manual contained this statement
printed in italics and outlined in red:
The contents of this handbook are presented as a matter of infor-
mation only. While General Motors believes wholeheartedly in
the plans, policies, and procedures described here, they are not
conditions of employment. General Motors reserves the right to
modify, revoke, suspend, terminate, or change any or all such
plans, policies, or procedures, in whole or in part, at any time,
with or without notice. The language used in this handbook is not
intended to create, nor is it to be construed to constitute, a con-
tract between General Motors and any one or all of its
employees.
89
Courts have also reviewed companies' past practices. In Pugh v. See-'
Candies, 190 the court considered that the company had an oral policy not to
discharge its employees but for good cause. All employers have unwritten
employment practices, since it is impossible to cover every instance of the
employment relation in written personnel policies. These unwritten prac-
tices should be carefully scrutinized to insure that none give rise to any
contractual expectations of job security. If a review reveals that such prac-
tices exist, an employer should change them by giving explicit notice to
employees disavowing the policy and defining its changes in order to avoid
claims of detrimental reliance by terminated workers.
1 91
Another type of evidence in many wrongful discharge cases is perform-
ance appraisals.192 Courts and juries undoubtedly will give little weight to
employer explanations of the shortcomings of a worker who has received
186. See note 164 supra.
187. See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980) (employer failed to follow termination guidelines); Hepp v. Lock-
heed-Cal. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411 (1978) (same).
188. 79 Mich. App. 93, 261 N.W.2d 222 (1977), rev'd, 402 Mich. 926, 282
N.W.2d 925 (1978).
189. Id at 95, 261 N.W.2d at 223.
190. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). See also Hepp v. Lock-
heed-Cal. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978).
191. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 169, at 519.
192. A recent survey of personnel executives found that over 90% of companies
responding had a formal program for appraising employees' performance. Per-
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numerous promotions and glowing evaluations. ' 93 Job reports are often
written simply to justify a standard raise or a minor promotion. In other
instances, supervisors make job evaluations positive to avoid friction with
employees or to make the supervisor's unit look productive. These over-
stated appraisals can be devastating evidence. On the other hand, properly
performed job evaluations can bring employees with work problems to light
at an early stage, when the difficulties can be corrected or the employee
released. A major consideration is impressing upon supervisors that per-
formance appraisals must conform to the truth. The following should be
used in all work evaluations: (1) objective criteria to measure job perform-
ance; (2) only firsthand data and observations; (3) personal conferences be-
tween supervisors and employees, and candid disclosures to the employee of
strengths and deficiencies; and (4) an appeal or objection procedure for em-
ployees who disagree with evaluations. Appeal procedures must be estab-
lished such that employees can use them without fear of reprisal and such
that supervisors will not feel challenged or threatened by their use.'
94
Finally, periodic audits of personnel files and practices should be un-
dertaken. Many employee files, which can span years of employment, con-
tain outdated and improper material.' 9 5 Management officials should
follow this rule: if you cannot justify the documents or statements about an
employee to yourself, you certainly will not be able to justify them to a jury.
Whistle-blowing cases require special consideration. An increasing
number of employees are alleging that they have been wrongfully termi-
nated for reporting improper or illegal acts to the company or government
officials.' 96 These cases can present a significant problem to companies that
deal in products or services that affect public health, safety or welfare. In
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 197 the plaintiff doctor disagreed with her
employer, a drug manufacturer, concerning the use of saccharin in an ex-
perimental medicine. The plaintiff terminated her employment and
brought a wrongful discharge action. Although the business of the em-
ployer involved serious risks due to the unknown consequences of experi-
mental drugs, and even though the company had followed all FDA
193. See Savodnik v. Korvettes, 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Pugh v.
See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 316-17, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 919 (1981); Cleary
v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980);
Cloutier v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 919, 436 A.2d 1140, 1144
(1981).
194. Although a large number of employers have performance reviews, only
one-third provide a formal grievance procedure for nonunion employees. See Per-
formance Appraisal Programs, Personnel Policies Forum Survey No. 135 (BNA), at
19-20 (Feb. 1983).
195. Seventy-five per cent of the respondents with formal appraisal program
kept these records indefinitely. Id at 20-21.
196. See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
197. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
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requirements for using experimental drugs, a sympathetic jury could easily
view the plaintiff as a champion of the public interest.
One way to deflect whistle-blowing lawsuits is to formulate a written
policy requiring that employees report what they consider to be improper
or illegal practices to a specified high level official. These reports must be
kept confidential and resolved as promptly as possible. This policy would
give a company an opportunity to rectify improper or unwarranted activi-
ties by lower level supervisors or employees. An employee who circum-
vented the internal procedure by directly filing a lawsuit would not be in a
sympathetic position, since the person has breached his or her obligation to
report such conduct to those in a position of authority.
D. Disipline and Employee Complaints
Most employers who operate under collective bargaining agreements
apply the concept of progressive discipline to employee misconduct.' 98
This system gives supervisors an opportunity to counsel and warn employ-
ees before discharge. Warnings allow employees the chance to correct defi-
ciencies in job performance. Related to the notion of progressive discipline
is the establishment of an internal mechanism to handle employee com-
plaints concerning discipline, work evaluations, job promotions, and other
employment related matters.' 9 9 Grievance procedures enable upper man-
agement to correct supervisory mistakes or to reinforce proper decisions by
front line foremen concerning the disciplining or evaluation of employees.
These policies enhance the fairness of employment decisions and make
them less susceptible to an attack in a suit for wrongful termination.
E. Tenmination
The employer should follow a specific procedure to insure that all cir-
cumstances surrounding termination are known and that all factors are
honestly evaluated. 2°° Discharges usually are initiated by lower level super-
visors and often are accompanied by improper motives or discrimination
which may give rise to wrongful discharge suits. In many cases, manage-
ment officials are ignorant of the problem until the employee sues.20 1 Ter-
mination procedure should at least include an unbiased review by a
designated official, such as the personnel director or plant manager. Since
many wrongful discharge lawsuits involve long term supervisory personnel,
a company should -also consider requiring prior approval by a corporate
198. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 169, at 630-32; GRIEVANCE GUIDE
(BNA) 10-11 (5thed. 1978).
199. Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the New Russian Roulette-Discharging Employees,
8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.. 380, 399-401 (1982-1983).
200. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 169, at 632-34.
201. See, e.g., Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, -, 429
N.E.2d 21, 26 (1981).
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EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
level officer before an employee with a certain number of years is
discharged.
Employers should also establish internal grievance procedures for ter-
minated workers, offering employees a forum to appeal firing decisions.
This review should be made by an individual who is removed from the
daily operations that gave rise to the discharge but who can effectively rec-
ommend either sustaining or overturning the discipline. Review insures
fairness when the serious step of discharge is taken; employees have a full
opportunity to present the other side.
20 2
Some companies have allowed voluntary arbitration of discharges
before a neutral arbitrator.2 °3 The aggrieved employee and management
choose a third party to hear the dispute and render a final, binding award.
Some critics might complain that, as in Cleag v. American Airlines,204 a griev-
ance procedure may be construed as an implied promise and the employer's
failure to follow it can become the basis for a wrongful discharge lawsuit.
Others might contend that arbitration would abolish the at will doctrine
and eliminate management discretion to fire incompetent workers. On the
contrary, a grievance-arbitration dispute resolution mechanism for dis-
charges has much to offer. Most commentators agree that courts will con-
tinue to erode the employment at will doctrine by allowing juries to find
implied agreements not to terminate except for cause, elements of promis-
sory estoppel, or public policy duties which have been violated by dis-
charges.215 A proper arbitration scheme should require the employee to
exhaust this internal remedy before filing a lawsuit, as presently occurs in
labor arbitration under company-union collective bargaining
agreements.
20 6
The parties should be able to define the standards of employment and
determine the authority of an arbitrator to review a firings. The parties'
intent should control the arbitrator.20 7 For instance, an employer could
state that its officials should be the judge of whether an employee has met
production standards and that their decisions should be overturned only if
the employee presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. An-
other method to limit the discretion of the arbitrator is to include a clause
that the arbitrator can only make a determination as to whether the em-
202. For an example of a comprehensive internal dispute resolution procedure
adopted by the Garrett Corporation, a large Los Angeles aerospace firm, see Prevent-
ing Disputes, I ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 1, 10-11 (1983).
203. Id
204. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722.
205. See notes 97-141 and accompanying text supra.
206. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
599 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co, 363 U.S. 574,
575 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
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ployee committed the misconduct which has been alleged, and if the arbi-
trator finds that misconduct has occurred, then he or she must uphold the
penalty assessed by management.2 °" There is a ready source of labor arbi-
trators2 09 who are experts in balancing employees' rights and management
interests. 2 10 Unlike most juries, arbitrators tend not to be biased in the em-
208. Reflecting the strong national labor policy regarding arbitration, the
Supreme Court has limited the federal standard of review for the decisions and
awards of arbitrators. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
568 (1960). So long as the award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement," a reviewing court must enforce it. 363 U.S. at 597. Where the parties
restrict the contractual authority of an arbitrator by limiting the remedies which an
arbitrator can grant or the extent to which an arbitrator can make a decision, the
arbitrator is not authorized to exceed the limits. See Grand Rapids Die Casting
Corp. v. Local Union No. 159, U.A.W., 684 F.2d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1982); Alabama
Educ. Ass'n v. Alabama Professional Staff Org., 655 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1981);
International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers Local 935-B v. Nestle Co., 630 F.2d 474, 477
(6th Cir. 1980); Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Motor Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d
692, 695 (10th Cir. 1977); Monogahela Power Co. v. IBEW Local No. 2332, 566
F.2d 1196, 1199 (4th Cir. 1976); Timken Co. v. Local No. 1123 United Steelwork-
ers, 482 F.2d 1012, 1014 (6th Cir. 1973); Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. Local 1549,
UAW, 451 F.2d 1277, 1280 (6th Cir. 1971); UAW Local 342 v. T.R.W., 402 F.2d
727, 732 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969); Truck Drivers & Helpers
Union Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1964); ARCO
Polymers v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 8-74, 517 F. Supp. 681, 685
(W.D. Pa. 1981).
209. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,supra note 169, at 24-25; 0. FAIRWEATHER,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 66-74 (1973); D. NOLAN, LA-
BOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 12-22 (1979).
210. The Supreme Court has recognized the expertise of labor arbitrators:
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provi-
sions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the
industry and the shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining
agreement although not expressed in it. The labor arbitrator is usually
chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common
law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judg-
ment. The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will
reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bar-
gaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of
a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objec-
tive in using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common
goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agree-
ment serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected
to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determina-
tion of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.
(Vol. 48
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Voluntary arbitration would limit the damages which employees have
been recovering in actions based upon breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing or in tort suits. Under a contractual system of arbi-
tration, compensatory or punitive damages are rarely allowed. 2 1 Arbitra-
tors usually limit remedies to sustaining the termination or reinstating the
employee with or without backpay.212 Requiring employees to bear part of
the arbitration expenses deters frivolous complaints. Arbitration would aid
all parties by limiting the cost and delays of litigation. 213
Perhaps the most significant benefit of a voluntary arbitration system
is that courts are likely to uphold arbitrators' decisions if a full and fair
hearing has been allowed.2 14 Many courts have deferred to employee dis-
charge arbitration awards.2 15 Consequently, a large number of companies
like Bank of America, Control Data, Pitney-Bowes, and Trans World Air-
lines include grievance procedures in their employee personnel practices. 21 6
Discharged employees should be given exit interviews. 217 These are
particularly appropriate for employees with a number of years of service.
Although emotions run high on both sides after a termination, an employer
should always remember that a loss of employment is a devastating per-
sonal experience. Often company personnel can provide aid through coun-
seling or referral to services such as placement and social services agencies.
In addition, accrued rights and the availability of insurance, pension or
other benefits can be explained to the employee. An exit interview also
provides a last opportunity for an employer to determine whether employee
claims or lawsuits are likely. Management might also want to consider at
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
211. Arbitrators have generally been unwilling to award punitive or exemplary
damages because their retributive aspect is foreign to the need for amicable settle-
ment of disputes through grievance and arbitration procedures. 0. FAIRWEATHER,
supra note 209, at 303. See also M. HILL, JR. & A. SINICROP, REMEDIES IN ARBI-
TRATION 184-85 (1981); D. NOLAN, supra note 209, at 188-89.
212. 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 209, at 280-300; M. HILL & A. SINICROP,
supra note 211, at 40-96; D. NOLAN, supra note 209, at 183-84.
213. Federal civil cases that proceed to trial average 19 months from filing to
disposition. UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATORS OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AN-
NUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR A-30 (1979). During the same year, the average
time from the filing of a grievance to the rendering of an award by an arbitrator
was a little over eight months. 1981 FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV-
ICE ANNUAL REPORT 39.
214. Se Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 624, 292 N.W.2d
880, 897 (1980).
215. See Corbin v. Pan Am. World Airways, 432 F. Supp. 939, 943 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
216. See Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 26, col. 3.
217. Brown, supra note 199, at 398.
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this time the advisability of a severance agreement. The company might
decide to offer accrued benefits and/or additional benefits, such as a mone-
tary settlement or offer of a favorable reference letter, in return for an em-
ployee release or covenant not to sue and an agreement not to discuss the
situation or settlement with others.2" ' These settlements are a valuable al-
ternative to costly litigation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The employment at will doctrine presents management with a two-
edged sword. In the wake of the continuing erosion of the employment at
will theory, the delusion that a company can fire employees for any reason
or no reason invites disaster. On the other hand, the more an employer
establishes policies of progressive discipline, employee grievance and review
procedures, and voluntary arbitration, the more it may be found to be
bound by such practices. By carefully tailoring employment practices, how-
ever, an employer should be able to decrease the potential liability for
wrongful discharges on the theory of contractual violations of agreements
not to discharge without just cause and to avoid the establishment of un-
warranted expectations which can give rise to an action based upon promis-
sory estoppel. Cautious drafting will not eliminate suits for wrongful
discharge based on either the theory of a breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or based on a wrongful discharge tort theory,
but the use of independent review mechanisms and appropriate grievance-
arbitration procedures should minimize the possibilities of terminations mo-
tivated by improper intent or which violate public policy. The goal of
modem labor relations is certainly to treat the individual employee fairly
and justly. By establishing such procedures, employers will insure that
those employees who must be dismissed are done so with just cause-which
is the best defense against any action of alleged wrongful discharge.
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